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Over the last two decades, a mature academic literature has 
developed about how we might use incentives as a complement to 
discretionary judicial decisions for controlling civil discovery. Professor 
Brian Fitzpatrick and the other organizers of the Vanderbilt Law 
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 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. 
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Review “Future of Discovery” Symposium thought it would make sense 
to start this symposium by summarizing what has been written 
previously on the subject in the hope that the next time that the rules 
advisory committee tries again to solve the problem2 of properly 
managing discovery, it might benefit from some of this learning. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL DISCOVERY AND ITS ABUSE 
The allocation of discovery costs first became a significant issue 
after the Xerox copying machine went on the market in 1959. Prior to 
that time, the focus in discovery had been on live depositions to avoid 
surprise at trial, so costs were limited. One of my mentors, the late 
federal district judge Gerhard Gesell, a prominent antitrust litigator in 
the 1960s,3 once told me that even in a complex antitrust case, lawyers 
would typically send out only four or five documents to be copied by 
“photostat,” essentially a photographic negative, to use as exhibits at 
trial.4 Until 1970, Rule 34, relating to production of documents, actually 
required leave of court and a showing of good cause to obtain any 
production of documents.5 All of that changed in the 1960s and 1970s 
with the widespread use of xerographic methods for copying 
documents.6 By 1978, the Manual for Complex Litigation was 
recommending “wave discovery,” beginning with broad production of 
documents as the first step in complex cases.7 Expanded production of 
documents made possible by improvements in copying technology 
meant that in big cases with a lot at stake, the parties now exchanged 
 
 2. I call discovery a “problem” because the Rules Advisory Committee keeps amending the 
rules to try to solve it. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery 
Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 773 n.1 (2011) 
(collecting examples). I am well aware, however, as the literature has shown for over twenty years, 
that extensive discovery is limited to a subset of cases. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of 
Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 597 (1998):  
The recent studies of civil discovery . . . establish beyond any reasonable doubt that we 
have two very distinct worlds of civil discovery. These worlds involve different kinds of 
cases, financial stakes, contentiousness, complexity . . . . The ordinary cases, which 
represent the overwhelming number, pass through the courts relatively cheaply with 
few discovery problems. The high-stakes, high-conflict cases, in contrast, raise many 
more problems and involve much higher stakes. 
 3. See CHARLES A. MILLER, COVINGTON: A CENTENNIAL STORY 14 (2018) (referring to Gesell 
as a “legendary” antitrust litigator); see also id. at 13 (describing copying documents by Thermofax 
and photostat prior to the advent of Xerox photocopying).  
 4. Personal communication. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. 
 6. As the problem of excessive discovery costs was largely created by technological 
developments, there is some chance that electronic discovery by computer searches may reduce 
search costs enough to make the problem more tractable. 
 7. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2 (1978). 
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and paid lawyers to examine thousands, and sometimes millions, of 
documents—very few of which were actually used at trial8—prior to 
taking depositions. 
The next major development was an unfortunate and not very 
thoughtful U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1978, Oppenheimer 
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.9 It created the default rule that still applies 
today that a “presumption”10 exists that the party responding to a 
discovery request must pay the costs of complying. Unfortunately, that 
decision was written just as law and economics was beginning to make 
its way into law schools11 and, through them, into the minds of law 
clerks. In 1978, however, the Supreme Court paid no attention to the 
potential strategic or incentive effects of allowing a requester to impose 
virtually unlimited costs on an opponent through discovery requests 
that were only tangentially related to the “subject matter” of the 
litigation (as Rule 26 then read).12 
When one reads the Oppenheimer Fund opinion today, one will 
find that the actual decision is not an insuperable impediment to 
reform. The issue in the case was not the allocation of the costs of 
discovery but rather which side should pay for the notice to a class 
required under Rule 23. Rather than just holding that the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer should pay for notice to the class because he or she will benefit 
financially from the formation of a class—as I suspect that Marty 
Redish and I would13—the Supreme Court looked by analogy to the 
“practice” under the discovery rules and decided that a “presumption” 
should apply that a party complying with a court order must ordinarily 
pay the costs of complying.14 The court did acknowledge, however, that 
the judge has discretion to “shift” costs to the other side.15 I hate that 
term, “cost shifting,” because it suggests that costs naturally fall on one 
 
 8. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 3 
(2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_major_companies_ 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTN4-46QF] (“The ratio of pages discovered to pages entered as exhibits is 
as high as 1000/1. In 2008, on average, 4,980,441 pages of documents were produced in discovery 
in major cases that went to trial—but only 4,772 exhibit pages actually were marked.”).  
 9. 437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
 10. Id. at 358. 
 11.  See Robin I. Mordfin & Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, Chicago and Law and Economics: A 
History, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/chicago-and-law-and-
economics-history [https://perma.cc/TM7W-9TR3] (detailing the growth of law and economics at 
law schools in the 1970s, which “were one of the most exciting times in the study of law and 
economics”). 
 12.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 13. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 777 (arguing that requesters should generally 
bear costs of discovery under quantum meruit principles because they benefit from the production 
of the information). 
14. 437 U.S. at 358.  
 15. Id. 
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side or the other and may only be “shifted” to the other side for some 
special reason. As Ronald Coase famously showed in 1960,16 fencing 
costs do not fall naturally on either farmers or ranchers or, by extension, 
on requesters or responders to discovery. Rather, they are a product of 
their joint activity, and thus it is a policy decision for the law to allocate 
the costs to one or the other.17 In my view, the proper policy decision is 
that the discovery rules should create incentives to produce a socially 
efficient level of discovery. The goal of a socially efficient level of 
discovery means that the parties should have enough discovery to reach 
a just result in settlement or at trial but without so much discovery that 
its costs become an impediment to reaching a just result in settlement 
or at trial. But as far as is apparent from its opinion, the Court that 
decided the Oppenheimer Fund case in 1978 was unaware of Coase’s 
work and its implications for the allocation of discovery costs. 
The key sentence about discovery in Oppenheimer Fund was the 
following: 
Under th[e discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the 
expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke the district court’s 
discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from “undue burden or 
expense” in doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s 
payment of the costs of discovery.18 
The problem—which still bedevils us today—is that while both 
the Supreme Court in 1978 and the Advisory Committee in 2015 stated 
that judges have discretion to allocate costs to the requester, neither of 
them gave a hint as to what valid grounds for doing so might be. “Undue 
burden or expense” is a circular riddle: How is a judge supposed to 
decide what is “due” and what is “undue”? The question at issue is how 
much expense each side should bear and under what circumstances. As 
a result, the discretionary rule announced in Oppenheimer Fund has, 
in practice, reified into an almost unfailing obligation that responding 
parties pay for whatever discovery the requester is entitled to under the 
broad scope of the federal rules, whether the requester actually needs 
it or not.19  
The principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Dean (later Second Circuit Judge) Charles Clark, explained the 
problem with such broad, standardless discretionary approaches to 
 
 16. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1960).  
 17. See Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 885, 886–87 (2012) (applying the Coase theorem to allocation of discovery costs). 
 18. 437 U.S. at 358 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)). 
 19. For an interesting exception in the context of an administrative subpoena by a federal 
agency, see SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which noted that 
the reviewing court may provide for reimbursement of expenses to comply with an administrative 
subpoena if the burden of complying has become “unreasonable.” 
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judicial management. In a brilliant article in 1950, also in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review, Dean Clark reflected on the successes and 
failures of the 1938 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a dozen years after their adoption.20 One of the main lessons 
he drew from his experience was that to be effective, rules should not 
merely grant discretionary power but also “explain” how that power is 
to be used by giving illustrations:  
[W]ithout a tradition for the exercise of discretion, a general grant of power is likely to 
accomplish little. . . . If left to their own devices, without any precise guide beyond a 
general authorization, [courts] will stick to what they have known in the past. . . . A basic 
reason for the effectiveness of the federal rule authorizing pre‐trial procedure is its careful 
statement of possible issues to be pre‐tried, at the same time that it grants broad 
discretion to the court.21 
II.REGULATING DISCOVERY THROUGH INCENTIVES 
In what follows, I will summarize the key points in the academic 
literature about allocation of discovery costs that have developed over 
the last generation in response to the flawed, standardless rule 
announced in the Oppenheimer Fund decision that discovery and its 
costs should be “managed” by judges deciding what costs are “due” or 
“undue” with no lodestar to guide them. 
A. Elliott (1986): The Limits of Judicial Second-Guessing and 
Incentives to Help Regulate Discovery 
The first article of which I am aware to try to unravel the 
Sphinx’s riddle of when requesters, as opposed to responders, should 
pay for the costs of discovery by looking at the incentives created was 
my own 1986 article in The University of Chicago Law Review.22 In it, I 
argued: 
[W]e should think about civil procedure less from the perspective of powers granted to 
judges, and more from the perspective of incentives created for lawyers and clients. Our 
current system of civil litigation creates perverse incentives for lawyers, and then relies 
on judges to police litigant behavior through techniques like managerial judging. If we 
are not satisfied with the results, we should redesign the system to provide direct 
incentives for appropriate behavior.23 
Later in that article, I applied this general perspective of 
regulating litigation behavior through incentives, as opposed to 
 
 20. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and 
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 497 & nn.9–10 (1950). 
 21. Id. at 501. 
 22. E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
306 (1986). 
 23. Id. at 308. 
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discretionary judicial-management decisions, to discovery.24 The core of 
my argument was that what are called “monitoring problems” in 
economics (that is, the judge’s inability to second-guess how much and 
what kind of discovery a litigant actually needs) suggest that we should 
regulate the quantum of discovery through incentives on the requester 
rather than judicial second-guessing or arbitrary limits.25 Two 
examples of incentive-based approaches to managing discovery that 
have been broadly accepted since I wrote in 1986 are setting a firm trial 
date and limiting the number of interrogatories.26 Both approaches 
create an incentive for the requester to prioritize, which makes the 
judge’s job easier but does not entirely replace discretionary judicial 
management. 
I call using incentives as well as discretionary orders “the 
regulatory approach” to civil procedure. I can see, in retrospect, that it 
was natural for me to think about trying to manage behavior in 
litigation through incentives as well as discretionary judicial orders 
because I also work in the field of environmental law. Beginning in the 
early 1980s, environmental law was in the midst of a revolution in the 
use of economic incentives, such as marketable permits like those 
created by the acid-rain trading program under the 1990 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act27 as well as “command-and-control” regulation by 
officials to manage pollution.28 The two problems seemed similar to me 
in that in both situations, officials lack sufficient information to make 
well-informed decisions about how to allocate resources. The Nobel 
Prize–winning economic theorist Friedrich Hayek contended that the 
inability of government officials to marshal enough information to make 
centralized resource-allocation decisions is endemic to all types of 
central planning.29 What this boils down to in the context of discovery 
is that the requester generally knows better than the judge what he or 
she really needs to develop his or her case. The challenge is to create a 
structure of incentives that causes the requester only to request 
 
 24. Id. at 310–15. 
 25. Id. at 331. 
 26. Id. at 312–13. 
 27.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584–634 (1990). 
 28. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334–40 (1985) (discussing the shift from traditional command-and-control 
regulation to a system of economic incentives). 
 29. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F. A. HAYEK 66, 76–
77 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988) (analyzing how decentralization allows multiple people to utilize 
the information they possess, thereby increasing the total amount of information taken into 
account in decisionmaking); see also Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits 
of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985) (criticizing command-and-control 
environmental regulation as “Soviet-style centralized planning”). 
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information if the likely benefit to his or her case or to improving the 
accuracy of case assessment by both sides exceeds the cost to the 
requester to producing it. This is called the question of “allocative 
efficiency” in economics,30 but it boils down to making sure that “the 
game is worth the candle.”  
I later returned to discovery in a 2012 article, in which I 
expanded upon my basic notion that a modified form of a “requester-
pays” standard makes sense as a way to ration the proper amount of 
discovery.31 There I argued for a limited amount of free discovery but 
with the right of the requester’s lawyer to obtain more if he or she is 
willing to pay for it. This approach is actually more favorable to 
requesters than the current system because they can obtain discovery 
despite a judicial ruling that it is not needed or proportional to the 
needs of the case, provided they are willing to pay for it. 
B. Setear and Easterbrook (1989): Strategic Incentives for Impositional 
Discovery 
An important dimension to the problem of regulating discovery 
costs that I had overlooked was supplied a few years later in a brilliant 
article by John Setear,32 at the time a defense analyst for the RAND 
Corporation and currently a law professor at the University of Virginia, 
and a comment on Professor Setear’s article by Frank Easterbrook,33 
then already a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit but also still a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law 
School. Whereas my article had largely focused on the overall level of 
discovery expense, Professor Setear and Judge Easterbrook developed 
the key insight that the requester has a strong strategic incentive to 
overuse discovery to impose costs on the other side in litigation and 
thereby apply pressure to coerce settlements.34  
Professor Setear developed a game-theoretic analysis of 
discovery by comparison to the logic of nuclear deterrence, but perhaps 
his key insight is the concept he calls “impositional discovery,” discovery 
 
 30. What Is Allocative Efficiency?, MY ACCT. COURSE, https://www.myaccountingcourse.com/ 
accounting-dictionary/allocative-efficiency (last visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RKJ2-
EGMX] (“Allocative efficiency is an economic concept that occurs when the output of production is 
as close as possible to the marginal cost.”). 
 31. E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) Is 
Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV. 895, 953–56 (2012).  
 32. John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear 
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989). 
 33. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989). 
 34. Id. at 637; Setear, supra note 32, at 582. 
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that is requested primarily not to obtain needed information but to 
impose costs on the other side: 
In the economic view of such a decision [to tender a discovery request], a party to 
litigation will tender a request whenever the benefits to her of doing so exceed the costs 
of formulating the request. It is possible to separate these benefits into two broad 
categories: “informational benefits” and “impositional benefits.” “Informational 
benefits” are benefits that the requesting party expects to gain from the information 
that she receives from the responding party. Factual statements from the responding 
party can increase the requesting party’s ability to hone the legal basis for her case, or 
help her estimate the value of the stakes in the case and her chances of prevailing on 
the merits.
 
“Impositional benefits,” in contrast, are those benefits that the requesting 
party expects to gain because her request imposes costs upon the answering party.35 
In his comment on Professor Setear’s article, Judge Easterbrook 
developed the implications for rulemakers of the “impositional 
discovery” concept. Like me, Judge Easterbrook thinks that judges are 
not very good at detecting impositional, as opposed to legitimate, 
discovery: 
Impositional discovery depends on asymmetric stakes: the requester incurs lower costs 
than the person interrogated. The requester saddles its adversary with these costs to 
improve its bargaining position. We could do what almost every other civilized legal 
system does and deny the abuser the fruits, requiring it to pay the costs it has imposed. 
This does not mean “sanctions”; when legitimate and impositional requests look alike, the 
threat of sanctions is hollow. Only an automatic reversal of costs is likely to do the trick. 
The [requesting] party always knows better than the judge which requests are legitimate 
and which are impositional.36 
Judge Easterbrook also made short work of the canard, which 
still bothers many other judges, that making requesters or their 
lawyers pay for some portion of the costs of the discovery that they 
demand would adversely affect the poor by depriving them of access to 
the courts: 
A proposal to require losers to pay winners’ fees and costs—even one so modest as 
Professor Elliott’s—invariably induces the rejoinder: That would freeze poor persons and 
those of modest resources out of court! Not likely; the poor routinely are excused from 
paying costs now, and such an exception would apply to any loser-pays system. . . . Those 
of modest means rarely participate in the kinds of cases in which there is voluminous 
discovery even under current rules. . . . Impositional discovery is practiced in big-stakes 
cases between substantial litigants, represented by the most costly legal talent. This 
problem should be tackled, with the difficulties of impoverished and middle-class litigants 
carved off for different treatment if need be.37 
The modest proposal to which Judge Easterbrook referred is one 
I made from the floor of the Boston University discovery conference to 
add the costs of responding to discovery to the costs that are taxed if a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment is rejected and the ultimate judgment is less 
 
 35. Setear, supra note 32, at 581–82 (footnote omitted). 
 36. Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 645. 
 37. Id. at 646. 
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than the offer that was rejected.38 This modest form of a “loser-pays” 
rule for the costs of discovery is similar to one later advanced by 
Cameron Norris that the costs of responding to discovery could be taxed 
against the party losing a motion for summary judgment.39 In both 
situations, the party seeking discovery may obtain it but has to pay for 
it if it turns out that its claim that it needed the discovery to 
substantiate a valid claim was incorrect. This feature of determining 
who pays retroactively, when it may be clearer whether the discovery 
in question was or was not really needed, distinguishes these proposals 
from the Redish-McNamara proposal discussed later.40  
The Setear-Easterbrook argument, that discovery is used 
strategically to impose costs on the other side in order to affect 
settlement values, is an application of a general principle developed a 
few years earlier by two then–University of Chicago law professors, 
William Landes and Richard Posner.41 Their seminal article 
Adjudication as a Private Good demonstrated that settlement values 
are affected by procedural costs as well as the underlying merits of the 
case.42 The Setear-Easterbrook argument applies that general insight 
to discovery and suggests that litigants have a strong incentive to use 
unnecessary discovery to bludgeon their opponents to settle in order to 
avoid procedural costs, rather than costs of the underlying merits of the 
case.43 
The title chosen by Professors Landes and Posner, Adjudication 
as a Private Good, was unfortunate. It is a title that only an economist 
could love—or understand. Maybe it would have attracted more 
attention from judges if its title had been Why All of the Settlements 
Reached in America’s Civil Courts Are Unjust to One Degree or Another, 
because that’s exactly what the authors proved.44 Professors Landes 
and Posner proved that the settlement value of a case is a function not 
merely of the merits of the case but also the procedural costs avoided by 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 2117 (2018) (arguing requesters should be taxed the amount that producers pay to produce 
discovery, which would be given to the government). 
 40. See infra Section I.D (advocating for a requester-pays system because requesters are the 
beneficiaries of the discovery). 
 41. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 278–80 (1979) (exploring the effect that litigation expenditures have on settlement 
values). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 637; Setear, supra note 32, at 582. 
 44. Unfortunately, they proved it using algebra as well as words. Sometimes formulas with 
letters in them rather than numbers in examples can be off-putting to lawyers and judges. 
Consequently, when I teach their work, I provide numerical examples so that law students can 
better follow their argument.  
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settling rather than litigating.45 In some types of litigation, procedural 
costs avoided count for far more in determining settlement values than 
the anticipated outcome on the merits.46 Thus, for example, a number 
of studies have shown that up to ninety percent of the money paid in 
asbestos cases has gone to people who are not sick but who were named 
anyway as plaintiffs in lawsuits, thereby imposing procedural costs on 
the other side and creating settlement value.47 In other work, I have 
pointed out that creating monetary value merely by filing cases, 
meritorious or not, is a form of arbitrage,48 in which value can be created 
simply by the act of filing cases. Of course, no procedural system can be 
costless, but the high cost of broad discovery imposed at the will of the 
requester, typically with little or no policing by the court, exacerbates 
the problem of unjust settlements.  
No one knows what percentage of settlement dollars reflects the 
value of litigation costs avoided, as opposed to an assessment of the 
likely outcome on the merits, but one 2005 empirical study of 
employment discrimination cases concluded that it makes economic 
sense for an employer to pay at least $4,000 per claim, on top of any 
additional value for any merit to the claim, simply to avoid the costs of 
 
 45. This is especially true under the so-called “American Rule,” under which both sides bear 
their own litigation costs, but a few years later, Steven Shavell showed that the same general 
principle that procedural costs affect settlement outcomes also applies under different rules for 
allocating litigation costs. Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis 
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). 
 46. For example, at the Dallas miniconference on discovery in October 2012, which is 
discussed at the end of this article, Alex Demetrief, then vice president for Litigation and Legal 
Policy at General Electric (“GE”) and later its general counsel, stated that ninety percent of GE’s 
settlement decisions are driven by avoiding the costs of discovery, not the merits of the case.  
 47. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-
Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 
823 (2002) (“By all accounts, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in recent years have been 
on behalf of plaintiffs who . . . are completely asymptomatic.”); see also Christopher J. O’Malley, 
Note, Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1101, 1105 (“Most individuals with pleural plaques experience no lung impairment, no restrictions 
on movement, and usually do not experience any symptoms at all.”); Alex Berenson, A Surge in 
Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/04/10/business/a-surge-in-asbestos-suits-many-by-healthy-plaintiffs.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F9CW-GRGH] (“Very few new plaintiffs have serious injuries, even their lawyers acknowledge. . . . 
‘The overwhelming majority of these cases . . . are brought by people who have no impairment 
whatsoever.’ ”); Roger Parloff, Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2004), 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/09/06/380311/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/46QU-MBSH] (“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal 
judges in this area, two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’—that is, they have 
slight or no physical symptoms.”). 
 48. Elliott, supra note 31, at 955. See generally Philip H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, 
Arbitrage, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY ECON. (1987), https://link.springer.com/ 
referenceworkentry/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_449-1 [https://perma.cc/ZDN5-NKBR] (“An 
arbitrage opportunity is an investment strategy that guarantees a positive payoff in some 
contingency with no possibility of a negative payoff and with no net investment.”). 
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defense.49 In my experience, today a lot more than $4,000 per case is 
attributable to litigation costs avoided. Thus, the more latitude that 
judges give requesters to impose unnecessary discovery costs on their 
litigation opponents, the further settlements will deviate from the 
theoretical ideal of an assessment of the likely outcome. 
It has always puzzled me why judges are not more concerned 
that they are dispensing injustice rather than justice on a daily basis in 
their courtrooms, which is exactly what happens when cases settle to 
avoid unnecessary discovery costs rather than costs based on an honest 
appraisal of their merits. My friend Randy Shepard, the former Chief 
Justice of Indiana, has suggested to me that this may be because under 
the federal system, except in class actions, judges rarely ever see either 
the costs of discovery or the amounts of the settlements that are made 
primarily to avoid litigation costs.50 
C. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994): Strategic Cost Imposition by 
Responders  
The next major development in the field was a comprehensive 
analysis of the economics of discovery in the leading law and economics 
journal, The Journal of Legal Studies, by Robert Cooter, a Berkeley 
economist, and Daniel Rubinfeld, who at the time was a law professor 
at Berkeley but currently teaches at NYU.51  
By my lights, Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld went wrong by 
discounting requester-pays systems as merely moving the judicial 
monitoring problem to the costs of complying. They rightly pointed out 
that under a pure requester-pays system, the party complying with 
discovery requests has a strategic incentive to inflate the costs of 
complying in order to impose costs strategically on the other side.52 But 
what Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld overlooked, in my opinion, is that 
in practice, the risks of the strategic imposition of cost are not 
symmetrical: it is much easier to impose costs by broad discovery 
 
 49. David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment 
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1579 (2005) (“Because it 
costs employers (1) between $4000 and $10,000 to defend an EEOC charge, (2) at least $75,000 to 
take a case to summary judgment, and (3) at least $125,000 and possibly over $500,000 to defend 
a case at trial, it almost always makes good business sense to settle a case for $4000.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Costs will vary, however, by geographic area of the country and type of case. 
 50. Personal Communication. 
 51. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1994); see also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Discovery, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 609, 612–14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the 
potential for abuse of discovery and proposing a shift of discovery costs so that they fall on the 
requesting party). 
 52.  Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 51, at 454. 
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requests that might lead to admissible information than it is to inflate 
the costs of compliance. Judges are better at identifying and second-
guessing inflated production costs; they do something similar all the 
time in cases in which they award legal fees. 
D. Redish and McNamara (2011): A Quantum Meruit Argument for a 
Requester-Pays System 
The next major development in the field was an article by Marty 
Redish of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and his then-student 
Colleen McNamara.53 By analogy to the common law, quasi contract 
concept of quantum meruit, to prevent unjust enrichment, Professor 
Redish and McNamara argued that requesters should generally pay for 
discovery because they are its beneficiaries: 
Absent compensation to the party that produced the information, the enrichment of the 
requesting party is indeed unjust. . . . [T]he producing party not only bears the financial 
costs of complying with its opponent’s request, but it also suffers the additional detriment 
of having the fruits of its labor used against it in the ongoing litigation. Essentially, the 
producing party suffers on two distinct levels as a result of its efforts. The requesting 
party, in turn, receives two distinct benefits as a result of the producing party’s work: it 
obtains the immediate benefit of receiving the specific information it requested, as well 
as a simultaneous detriment to its opponent.54 
As appealing as this argument may be, a possible rejoinder is 
that the requester is claiming a preexisting wrong by her opponent that 
discovery is supposedly necessary to set right. No one would claim that 
a bank robber is entitled to recover in quantum meruit from his victim 
when the police confiscate his ill-gotten gains and return it to its 
rightful owner, even though, when viewed in isolation, the bank obtains 
a benefit compared with the situation immediately prior to the 
transfer.55 Making the requester pay automatically for discovery that 
was necessary to redress an injury or defense that turns out to be valid 
does not increase fairness but adds insult to injury. Unlike in loser-pays 
approaches to allocating litigation costs, the court does not know, at the 
time discovery is requested, whether the claim that the requester has 
been wronged and needs discovery to rectify that wrong is valid.56 Thus, 
instead of assuming, as did Professor Redish and McNamara, that a 
 
 53. Redish & McNamara, supra note 2.  
 54. Id. at 790 (footnote omitted). 
 55. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant would be entitled may be 
limited or denied because of the claimant’s inequitable conduct in the transaction that is the source 
of the asserted liability.”). 
 56. This analysis applies equally whether the requester is plaintiff or defendant. A 
defendant-requester is seeking information in discovery to help make out a defense that might 
reduce or eliminate the claims wrongfully brought against it. 
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requester should always pay for discovery because the requester 
benefits from it, I favor approaches like Cameron Norris’s or the one 
that I suggested at the Boston University discovery conference in 1988, 
based on Rule 68 offers of judgment.57 These approaches allocate the 
costs of discovery retroactively when it is easier to determine, in 
hindsight, whether the information produced in discovery was actually 
necessary to right an injustice. 
E. Bone (2003): Diverging Client and Attorney Interests with Regard  
to Discovery  
The final work I will discuss is chapter 7 of Professor Robert G. 
Bone’s masterful book Civil Procedure: The Economics of Civil 
Procedure.58 Professor Bone was professor of law and Harry Elwood 
Warren Scholar at Boston University Law School when the book first 
appeared in 2003 and is now professor of law at the University of Texas 
at Austin, where he holds the G. Rollie White Teaching Excellence 
Chair in Law.59 
Professor Bone’s book collects the literature and develops the 
economic perspective on many issues in civil procedure in three 
hundred pages of clear, brilliantly written explanation. It appears 
designed to be used as supplementary reading along with the standard 
legalistic casebook in a course in civil procedure, and I have used it 
myself in that role when teaching both introductory and advanced civil 
procedure at Yale Law School. 
Chapter 7 is about discovery.60 In clear, easily understandable 
prose, Professor Bone summarized the existing literature and described 
the problem of managing discovery clearly from an economic 
perspective. He began with the benefits of discovery: “This additional 
evidence [produced by formal, court-ordered discovery] has social value 
insofar as it improves the accuracy of trial outcomes and the quality of 
settlements negotiated in light of those outcomes.”61 
But Professor Bone also recognizes the potential for abusive or 
excessive discovery as identified by Professor Setear, Judge 
Easterbrook, and others: 
 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 39 (proposing that costs of responding to discovery 
should be added to costs that are taxed if the ultimate judgment is less than a Rule 68 offer that 
had previously been rejected). 
 58. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003). 
 59. Robert G. Bone, U. TEX. AUSTIN SCH. L., https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/robert-g-bone/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/N3PZ-RT96]. 
 60. BONE, supra note 58, at 200–31. 
 61. Id. at 209. 
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In economic terms, an additional investment in discovery is “excessive” whenever the 
social costs of the investment exceed the social benefits. It is easy to see why parties 
engage in excessive discovery (defined in this way). The reason is that the party 
promulgating the discovery request does not bear the full costs and, in particular, does 
not have to pay an opponent’s response costs. Thus, parties engage in excessive discovery 
for the same reason firms pollute excessively: they are able to externalize a portion of 
the cost.62 
Professor Bone also sees that due to prevailing fee 
arrangements, lawyers themselves may have incentives to engage in 
discovery that diverge from the interests of their clients, a point that 
was perhaps implicit but not prominent in the prior literature: 
Cost-externalization is not the only reason for excessive discovery. Agency problems also 
contribute. Suppose, for example, that clients have difficulty monitoring their attorneys, 
who as a result have considerable freedom to pursue their own self-interest. If the 
arrangement is fee-for-services, the attorney is prone to engage in excessive discovery in 
order to pad fees.63 
In a speech to Lawyers for Civil Justice in 2012, I described 
discovery as “a public choice problem on steroids” because of the three 
separate perverse incentives that Professor Bone describes: (1) the 
requester does not pay the full social costs of discovery but can 
externalize most of them onto the complying party; (2) the requester 
has a strategic incentive to engage in impositional discovery to increase 
litigation costs and coerce more favorable settlements; and (3) if paid on 
an hourly basis, as most defense lawyers are, the defense lawyer may 
have a selfish incentive to engage in, or not resist, excessive discovery 
to enhance his or her own fees.64 
As is often the situation in law, it is easier to describe the 
problem than to find the optimal solution. Professor Bone first 
described expanding automatic production of information without a 
request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) to include all 
relevant information in the parties’ possession (which he called 
“mandatory disclosure,” a term I do not find particularly useful because 
all discovery required by court rules is “mandatory”).65 He pointed out 
that this approach might create an incentive to overproduce materials 
to try to hide the proverbial needle in a haystack.66 
Next he turned to limits on discovery, such as limiting the 
number of interrogatories or depositions that a party may request. He 
pointed out that 
 
 62. Id. at 217. 
 63. Id. at 218. 
 64. E. Donald Elliott, Litigation Costs: A Tragedy of the Commons on Steroids, Address to 
Lawyers for Civil Justice (May 4, 2012) (on file with author). 
 65. BONE, supra note 58, at 225–27. 
 66. Id. at 227. 
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[o]ne problem with strict limits is that they are insensitive to the specific discovery needs 
of particular cases. . . . For this reason, discovery limits are usually presumptive rather 
than strict; parties can exceed the limit with the court’s approval. However, making limits 
presumptive undermines their ability to reduce costs and control strategic abuse.67 
He concluded, somewhat tautologically: “From an economic 
perspective, the challenge is to design a system of limits that strikes the 
best balance between the benefit of reducing discovery excess and abuse 
and the cost of depriving parties of valuable information.”68 Again, it is 
easier to define the problem in economic terms than to specify a good 
solution.69 
Finally, Professor Bone turned to what he called “cost shifting,”70 
a term for which I have previously expressed my disapproval.71 In the 
main, he recognized the appeal of a requester-pays system from an 
economic perspective and, like me, he sees the problem as analogous to 
the well-understood problem of the economic incentives for excessive 
environmental pollution: 
Just as nuisance law deters pollution by forcing the polluter to internalize pollution costs, 
so too a cost-shifting rule deters excessive discovery by forcing a requesting party to 
internalize discovery costs. Moreover, cost-internalization is likely to have a salutary 
effect not only on excessive discovery but also on some types of abusive discovery. For 
example, a strategy of threatening discovery for its impositional value backfires when the 
abuser must pay the additional costs it threatens to create.72 
Another important incentive-based system for managing 
litigation behavior that Professor Bone discussed elsewhere in his book, 
but not with specific reference to discovery, is loser pays.73 Under a 
loser-pays system, the litigant whose position in the litigation has been 
determined to be invalid pays some or all of the costs of factual 
discovery, including those incurred, in the first instance, by his 
opponent. This approach is very common in many other countries and 
is probably the dominant solution to the problem worldwide.74 
 
 67. Id. at 228.  
 68. Id. at 229. 
 69. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About 
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 453–59 (1974) (criticizing economic analysis of law for merely 
restating problems in economic terminology). 
 70. BONE, supra note 58, at 229–31. 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
 72. BONE, supra note 58, at 230. 
 73. Id. at 158–86. 
 74. See Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in 11 IUS 
GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 3, 31 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) 
(“Almost all [thirty-five] systems covered in this chapter in principle shift the expenses of 
[discovery] to the loser, most in whole, some at least in large part.”). 
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III. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
I hope that the brief summary above shows that over the last 
generation, a number of leading academics have collectively developed 
a sophisticated and robust theory of what causes abusive and excessive 
discovery that is worthy of serious attention. Let us hope that the next 
time the Civil Rules Advisory Committee takes on the problem of 
controlling civil discovery yet again, it will give lawyer-economists and 
incentive-based approaches a seat at the table to develop ideas like 
those described above and in the balance of this symposium.75 
 
 
 75. Professor Bone and I were invited to the Advisory Committee’s September 2012 
miniconference on discovery in Dallas to address this topic, but they ran out of time before they 
got to us, and we were not allowed to address it. 
